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This paper supplements prior analysis on ‘patterns and prospects’ (Stephan, 2003) in which 
prospects for the speed of future productivity growth were assessed by looking at the 
specialisation patterns in domestic production. This analysis adds the foreign trade sphere to 
the results generated in the prior analysis. 
 
The refined results are broadly in line with the results from the original analysis, indicating the 
robustness of our methods applied in either analysis. The most prominent results pertain to 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. Those two countries appear to be best suited for swift 
productivity catch-up from the viewpoint of sectoral specialisation. Poland and Estonia exhibit 
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Introduction  
So far, economic theory lacks a coherent modelation of economic development that is able to 
take into account the role of sectoral specialisation patterns as explanatory factor. It is, 
however, plain to see that specialisation patterns do play an important role in determining the 
conditions for economic development. In a rather inductive methodology, we attempt to assess 
future potentials of backward countries to catch up via real economic integration. The EU 
accession countries are interesting cases to look at this: some experience with EU integration 
already exists for earlier waves of enlargement, and the countries in Central East Europe 
(CEE) are only starting their process of catching up. Structural change is a long-term effect of 
integration. In particular in post-socialist economies, the structural adjustments effected by 
integration with the West may take as long as up to 20 or 30 years (see Landesmann / 
Szekely, 1995). 
In our analysis, embedded in a larger international cooperation research project funded by the 
EU, we assess future prospects of CEECs by trying to determine their potentials for future 
labour productivity growth (in the following only ‘productivity’). We focus on the six most 
advanced EU accession countries, namely Estonia, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary and Slovenia (in geographical order). The time of analysis of 1995 and 1998 is 
particularly interesting: until 1994, the adjustment in the structure of domestic production and in 
exports to the EU was much less intense than the more profound changes later on. Halpern 
concluded already in 1995 that major changes were still to be expected after 1994. Our 
analysis (Stephan, 2003) also suggests that further changes to specialisation are to be 
expected: after all, specialisation patterns in foreign trade still remain significantly different from 
the patterns in domestic production as late as in 1998. The process of structural adjustment 
induced by integration is far from complete in EU accession countries, even after more than 
one decade of real economy integration. 
The analysis uses experience with past integration cases in Europe and a set of intuitive 
plausibility-assumptions, as well as some simple empirical calculations to carefully determine 
the relative positions of our six countries in a league table of future prospects of catching up. 
Some of the analysis draws from results of an earlier study in which future potentials were 
estimated by use of an empirical model of specialisation in domestic production only. The 
objective of this study is to refine the results of this prior analysis by incorporating the patterns 
of specialisation in foreign trade with the EU into the equation.  
The paper starts by explaining the intuition behind our hypothesis and the method of analysis. 
Following a brief description of the available stylised facts on specialisation patterns, the 
analysis determines the technological sophistication of patterns and the extent of 
correspondence between the t wo patterns in domestic production and foreign trade. The  
 IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
6 
paper closes with a qualitative assessment of CEEC’s potentials for future manufacturing 
productivity growth and a short summary with policy conclusions. 
1  Patterns of specialisation as determinants of productivity growth 
Productivity growth in an economy that is in the process of catching up to higher levels 
achieved by integration partners depends on a multitude of different determinants: domestic 
R&D, innovation capacities, the amount and kind of foreign direct investment (FDI), and the 
like. Until today, however, we lack a coherent theory of economic development which would 
be able to amalgamate all those determinants into one explanatory framework.1 
Yet, one characterisation incorporates most of  the information contained in productivity-
determinants needed to project at least the potentials for future productivity growth: the pattern 
of specialisation determines the potentials for indigenous technological development ( via 
domestic R&D, innovation capacities) and the potentials for technology transfer (via FDI). 
Some intuitively plausible examples in support of our hypothesis: we can safely assume that the 
larger the share of R&D-intensive production and the larger the share of innovation-intensive 
economic activity, the larger will be, in the first instance, the extent of R&D-activity and the 
number of innovations generated. It should be plain to see that higher R&D and innovation 
intensities typically improve the potentials for technological development and hence 
productivity growth. What could be considered to be just as important for future potentials for 
productivity growth, the amount and in particular the character of FDI, as well as the 
technology-transfer effects are also determined to some extent by the specialisation patterns of 
the host country: the larger the share of technology-intensive economic activity in the host 
country, the more will FDI target such production and allow subsidiaries to engage in own 
R&D and innovation production. Obviously, here, the base for potentials technology transfer is 
larger than in a scenario where the foreign investor benefits most by taking advantage of mainly 
lower production costs (i.e. extended workbench). Technological spillovers are also potential, 
i.e. even if FDI is exclusively technology-oriented, the amount of technology transferred still 
depends on the receptivity or absorptive capacity of the host economy, which again depends 
of the specialisation patterns of domestic production. 
Of course, those plausibility-rules also hold vice versa: the more an economy is dominated by 
labour-intensive production (possibly due to a comparative advantage in low labour costs), the 
more will FDI and international division of labour take the form of low-wage, low-value 
added, extended workbench activities. Whilst those are clearly less prone to higher levels of 
technological sophistication, low-wage comparative advantages are generally the typical  
 
                                                 
1  In a small number of singular theoretical works, the effects of particular patterns of specialisation have 
been linked to prospects for catching up development: e.g. in Snower (1994), a distinct specialisation on 
low-skill branches is shown to possibly lead into a development trap. ___________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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comparative advantage of EU accession  states in Central East Europe (CEE). Hence, we 
assume that structural patterns of specialisation in the manufacturing industries contain the 
‘necessary critical’ amount of information needed to assess potentials for future manufacturing 
productivity catch-up. 
In our analysis, we aggregate 3 -digit manufacturing branches into 4 homogeneous and 
overlap-free classes, each of which being characterised best by a common classifying criterion: 
the class of labour intensive branches, the class of marketing intensive branches, technology 
driven b ranches and such that demand, on average, only low skill levels from personnel 
engaged in those industries. The share of all branches considered in those four classes amounts 
to between 70 per cent and 90 per cent of total manufacturing - sufficiently high shares to 
assume representativeness. 
Of course, the method to work with classes of industrial branches is riddled with the problem 
that we have to assume that each industry will in fact be homogeneous with respect to the 
classification criterion. However, if we want to infer how the pattern of specialisation affects 
productivity growth potentials, we have to use some simplification. We accounted for this 
problem by using the lowest disaggregation of industries available,  i.e. 3 -digit NACE 
branches, for calculating the shares and for the classification. This is fortunately possible now 
with the publication of the new WIFO-taxonomy (Peneder 1999, 2000). A few stylised facts 
in support of our method: we can observe that in fact, manufacturing branches’ productivity 
levels not only differ across branches in the same country, the same branches across different 
countries also exhibit comparable deviations from the respective countries’ average: each 
branch typically uses different techniques and technologies in the production of value added 
that correspond to the respective type of product/production. Hence, in a developed 
manufacturing sector, each branch achieves a branch-specific productivity level, giving rise to a 
‘system of relative productivity levels’.2 This also applies to our four classes of manufacturing. 
What is even more, this categorisation also holds in terms of growth of branch-specific 
productivity levels: we can observe a ‘system of relative productivity growth rates’ relative to 
each manufacturing branch or class of manufacturing branches. Apparently, some branches 
lend themselves better to swift productivity convergence than other branches. 
                                                 
2  In particular, both in West and East Europe, the manufacturing branches of e.g. ‘textiles and textile 
products’, ‘leather and leather products’, and ‘furniture and recycling’ typically exhibit productivity 
levels well below the national average for total manufacturing. Branches like ‘coke, refined petroleum 
products and nuclear fuel’, ‘chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres’, and ‘transport 
equipment’ on the other end of the spectrum are typically situated at the top of the list of branches with 
respect to their relative productivity levels in total manufacturing. The branches listed at the bottom 
range of branch-specific productivity levels are typically associated with a high labour intensity and are 
rather less demanding on the qualification of personnel, whereas branches listed at the top of the range 
are typically characterised as being more technology and knowledge-driven. IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
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Accepting those assumptions and our methodological approach, prior attempts at estimating 
the future potentials of productivity growth yielded clear differences between the countries 
assessed here (Stephan, 20033): the patterns of specialisation in domestic production in the 
Slovak Republic turned out to be most adept to promise high potentials for productivity catch-
up vis-à-vis the current EU-average. The country is projected to achieve the highest growth 
rates of manufacturing productivity growth averaging over 8 per cent per anno between 2000 
and 2014. The second place in the result-list of our empirical model is shared by Hungary and 
Slovenia with projected rates averaging nearly 7 per cent, closely followed by the Czech 
Republic’s manufacturing sector with nearly 6 per cent. Projected potentials for manufacturing 
productivity growth in Estonia and Poland are much lower with 4 and 3 per cent per anno 
respectively: here, specialisation patterns in domestic production of manufacturing industries 
appear to be the least suited for swift productivity catch-up (ibid., p. 14).4 
This analysis, whilst incorporating the productivity growth experience of CEECs between 
1994 and 1999, and of Portugal, Greece and Spain for the years between 1973 and 1985 
(i.e. their own phase of integration into the European common market), however neglected the 
effects of structural patterns in foreign trade. Should we not expect that the composition of 
foreign trade will have some notable influence on the potentials of the trading country to catch 
up in domestic production in terms of productivity? After all, foreign trade, next to FDI, often 
plays a leading role for growth and technological development in lagging countries catching up 
by way of real economy integration: exports are already exposed to intense competition (more 
than domestic production, as here trade barriers like transportation costs, language barriers, 
etc. still apply) and they should “provide a better indication of CEEC comparative 
advantages” (Tajoli 2000, p. 10). Moreover, domestic demand in lagging countries is typically 
shallow and relatively less sophisticated in terms of the technology embedded in products; 
additional demand and demand for more sophisticated produce can however be found on 
more developed foreign markets. This way, the export sector typically serves as an engine for 
economic development in terms of quantity and quality (‘export-led growth’). Following our 
intuition, we would expect that the higher the technological sophistication of composition of 
foreign trade, the more pronounced will be productivity growth-accelerating effects of foreign 
trade, and vice versa. 
                                                 
3  In particular, this analysis estimated elasticities of our four classes of manufacturing with respect to 
their r ole for total manufacturing productivity growth by use of a linear regression model with 
manufacturing productivity growth as dependent variable and the shares of classes in total 
manufacturing as explanatory variables. The resulting coefficients for each class, duly interpreted as 
elasticities, will be used in the present analysis at a later stage. 
4  In fact, our prior estimations were conducted for four different scenarios. The results reported here 
pertain to the first scenario, a dynamic one in which the patterns of specialisation are not constant but 
evolve according to the trends exhibited in the past. This scenario was deemed to be the most relevant. 
The other scenarios assume structural convergence to different patterns existing in the current EU and 
one scenario assumes constant  patterns. Those attempts were used to better put results into 
perspective. ___________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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2  Stylised facts on specialisation patterns in foreign trade of 
CEECs with the EU and in CEEC’s domestic production 
Following the same method as in the analysis of specialisation of domestic manufacturing, the 
structures in foreign trade are assessed in terms of relative shares of classes of products. The 
classes consist once again of homogeneous, non-overlapping 3-digit NACE-industries.5 Here, 
the focus is on manufacturing industries: most tradeables are in fact to be found in 
manufacturing, and trade in (unprocessed) agricultural produce can be expected to be heavily 
distorted by the effects of European Common Agricultural Policy on prices and volumes. To 
be able to compare the patterns in domestic production and foreign trade, the same 
classification criteria, derived from the new WIFO taxonomy (Peneder, 1999, 2000) were 
applied for foreign trade. 
Table 1 provides a picture of respective patterns for the six EU accession countries for the 
years of 1995 and 1998. Whereas the patterns in domestic production are presented in shares 
in total employment for the cases of Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and in 
terms of value added shares for the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, the patterns of foreign 
trade report value-shares of exports of CEECs to the EU for all CEECs assessed here.6 
Alike in specialisation patterns of domestic production, specialisation in foreign trade with the 
EU exhibit high shares of labour intensive industrial branches in excess of 20 per cent: in 
Poland, the share is highest with slightly over 40 per cent, in Slovenia and Estonia slightly less 
than one third of foreign trade with the EU is from manufacturing branches which can be 
labelled as being typically labour intensive. Whereas this share has fallen between 1995 and 
1998 in the case of Slovenia, foreign trade in Estonia and Poland has become even more 
labour intensive. The lowest shares in labour intensive trade can be found in the Slovak 
Republic. In our analysis of domestic specialisation patterns and manufacturing productivity 
growth, we established a negative relationship between the share of labour intensive 
production and total manufacturing productivity growth with an elasticity of -0.4. 
Also of significant weight in trade with the EU are technology driven branches: in the Slovak 
Republic, more than 40 per cent of foreign trade is technology intensive, in Hungary, the share 
is higher than 30 per cent, in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the shares amount to around a 
quarter of total EU trade. Those shares, however, have only increased recently: in the  
Slovak Republic, the share of technology driven trade has  increased by a   stunning 
 
                                                 
5  In the case of foreign trade structures, a correspondence table to translate SITC into NACE was used. 
The author wishes to express his thanks to Maria-Luigia Seganana from Trento University for her 
providing the raw data readily translated. 
6  The different way to measure specialisation patterns between countries and domestic production and 
foreign trade are a sub-optimal solution and will result in some distortions. This, however, is a tribute to 
very limited data-availability. IWH ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1  Patterns of specialisation in foreign trade and in domestic production 
      Foreign trade specialisation patterns    Domestic production specialisation patterns 
      1995    1998    1998-1995    1995    1998    1998-1995 
Estonia  Labour intensive      29.3      31.4      + 2.1      34.6      37.5      + 2.9 
  Marketing intensive      25.7      26.3      + 0.5      28.1      27.3      - 0.8 
  Technology driven      2.8      5.8      + 3.0      8.3      9.0      + 0.7 
  Low-skilled      18.9      12.1      - 6.8      21.0      18.1      - 2.9 
Poland  Labour intensive      38.3      40.1      + 1.8      30.8      30.7      - 0.1 
  Marketing intensive      15.3      13.4      - 1.9      26.3      27.8      + 1.5 
  Technology driven      13.5      16.4      + 2.8      7.6      7.2      - 0.4 
  Low-skilled      18.4      14.4      - 4.0      20.9      21.4      + 0.5 
Czech Republic  Labour intensive      27.4      24.3      - 3.1      27.0      28.6      + 1.6 
  Marketing intensive      12.3      8.5      - 3.8      23.1      23.1      + 0.1 
  Technology driven      13.7      25.4      + 11.7      9.3      10.0      + 0.7 
  Low-skilled      19.5      15.1      - 4.4      16.8      15.4      - 1.4 
Slovak Republic  Labour intensive      28.4      20.0      - 8.5      15.3      18.4      + 3.1 
  Marketing intensive      13.7      9.5      - 4.2      21.0      21.0      +/- 0.0 
  Technology driven      19.5      41.5      + 22.0      9.2      11.7      + 2.5 
  Low-skilled      18.2      12.3      - 5.9      25.2      19.1      - 6.1 
Hungary  Labour intensive      25.3      25.0      - 0.3      25.6      25.6      + 0.1 
  Marketing intensive      17.5      10.2      - 7.3      30.2      27.1      - 3.1 
  Technology driven      24.3      31.9      + 7.6      9.6      11.7      + 2.1 
  Low-skilled      11.8      6.9      - 4.9      12.4      13.0      + 0.6 
Slovenia  Labour intensive      35.5      31.6      - 3.9      21.9      22.2      + 0.4 
  Marketing intensive      8.0      7.4      - 0.7      27.2      25.7      - 1.5 
  Technology driven      20.3      26.1      + 5.9      15.4      5.9      + 0.5 
  Low-skilled      14.1      12.6      - 1.5      14.4      13.8      - 0.6 
Note:  Foreign trade specialisation in per cent of value of total imports from CEECs to EU, domestic patterns in per cent of total employment or value added. Changes 
between 1995 and 1998 denoted in percentage points. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT (CRONOS), new WIFO taxonomy, own calculations. ___________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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22 percentage points, and in the Czech Republic by nearly 12 percentage points. Only in the 
case of Estonia (nearly 6 per cent) and Poland (slightly more than 16 per cent) are technology 
driven products in EU trade of only minor importance in terms of shares in 1998 and trend 
since 1995. In this class of manufacturing, our prior analysis established a positive relationship 
with an elasticity with productivity growth of +0.5. 
Marketing intensive branches turned out to be negatively associated with manufacturing 
productivity growth with an coefficient of -1.6. Foreign trade in products belonging to this 
class command high shares in Estonia (26.3 per cent) only. Also in this country, this share 
slightly increased, in all other countries, change between 1995 and 1998 in this trade class was 
negative. 
In all countries, trade in products of branches belonging to a manufacturing branch which is 
less demanding on the qualification of labour (low-skilled class) commands lower shares and is 
on the retreat. The association between the share of this class and productivity growth in 
domestic manufacturing turned out to be to the tune of -0.7.7 
In total, foreign trade does appear to mirror comparative advantages of relatively lower labour 
costs in EU accession states, which is particularly pronounced in Poland, Slovenia and 
Estonia. However, the trends in specialisation (low-skilled and labour intensity) between 1995 
and 1998 point to a redirection of foreign trade in terms of products exported to the EU. At 
first glance, the high and even increasing shares of EU trade in technology-driven produce 
appears to contradict comparative advantage-patterns. This, however, might well be an effect 
of FDI into EU accession states.8 In addition, this group of manufacturing commands much 
higher shares in foreign trade than in domestic production in all countries except Estonia. Low-
skilled manufacturing in contrast turns out to be more important in domestic production as 
compared to domestic trade. Those observations can serve as an indication of the “export-
led” hypothesis. 
3  The technological sophistication of foreign trade of CEECs with 
the EU and of CEEC’s domestic production 
Whilst this description of shares in foreign trade of EU accession states with the EU is 
informative, it cannot provide an unambiguous picture of specialisation patterns. We need  
 
                                                 
7  In terms of possible future patterns of specialisation, the analysis by Tajoli concludes that “we can 
expect to observe a shrinking of the more traditional and labour intensive sectors and an expansion of 
the mechanical sectors” (2000, p. 17). 
8  Lacking empirical evidence on the technological contents of FDI into EU accession states, we are 
unable to test this hypothesis. IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
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some weighting-coefficients to amalgamate the information contained in the shares of the four 
different groups of products. Our method to assess technological sophistication of foreign 
trade of CEECs with the EU makes use of the productivity growth elasticities of shares of 
classes of manufacturing established in our prior analysis for domestic production: were the 
shares of labour intensive production to rise by 1  per cent, our model would predict 
productivity growth to be lower by 0.4 per cent; the elasticities for the share of marketing 
intensive branches was estimated at -1.6 per cent, that for technology driven production +0.5 
per cent and the elasticity of low-skilled production was estimated to be -0.7 per cent. This 
provides us with the possibility to assess specialisation patterns, to determine whether they are 
more or less favourable for productivity growth,  i.e. whether they indicate high or low 
potentials for future productivity growth. This we denote ‘technological sophistication’ in the 
following. 
We calculate an indicator of technological sophistication by using those elasticities as weights 
for the empirical shares in foreign trade (table 2). This results in a purely synthetic indicator that 
amalgamates all the information contained in foreign trade specialisation patterns of CEECs. 
The higher the indicator, the more can foreign trade with the EU be considered technologically 
sophisticated: in 1998, the highest sophistication is indicated for the Slovak Republic and 
Hungary, followed by Slovenia and the Czech Republic. Poland and Estonia are much lower 
down the ranks. Whilst all EU accession countries exhibit a trend towards higher sophistication 
in foreign trade, the Slovak Republic’s high value has only emerged recently: in 1995, Slovak 
foreign trade with the EU was still less technologically sophisticated than e.g. that of Hungary 
of Slovenia. This might indicate once again the leading role of FDI, as such strong re-
specialisation of foreign trade would normally only be conceivable in times of selective trade 
liberalisation.  Vis-à-vis the EU, this, however, took place in the early 1990s. The trend 
between 1995 and 1998 shows significant growth of technological sophistication also for 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, the two countries with the prominently highest shares in FDI 
into the region.  
Table 2  Indicator of technological sophistication of foreign trade  
  Estonia    Poland    Czech Republic    Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
1995    - 64.7      - 46.0      - 37.4      - 36.3      - 34.3      - 26.8 
1998    - 60.2      - 39.4      - 21.1      - 11.1      - 15.1      - 20.2 
1998-1995    + 4.5      + 6.6      + 16.3      + 25.2      + 19.1      + 6.6 
Source:  EUROSTAT (CRONOS), new WIFO taxonomy, own calculations. 
In total, we can derive from this indicator of technological sophistication, that from the 
viewpoint of foreign trade specialisation, the Slovak Republic and Hungary are best suited to 
experience productivity growth in manufacturing industry, whereas Poland and Estonia exhibit 
the lowest potentials. ___________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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The same method was applied for the pattern of specialisation in domestic production of 
CEEC’s manufacturing industries.9 The indices of technological sophistication of domestic 
production are provided in table 3: as was to be expected following our assumption of 
‘export-led development’, the values of our indicator are lower than those for EU trade in all 
countries and for both 1995 and 1998. Moreover, the differences between the countries turn 
out to be much lower than for EU trade.  
Table 3  Indicator of technological sophistication of CEEC domestic production 
  Estonia    Poland    Czech Republic    Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
1995    - 69.4      - 65.3      - 54.8      - 52.7      - 62.4      - 54.7 
1998    - 66.9      - 68.2      - 54.2      - 48.8      - 56.8      - 51.8 
1998-1995    + 2.5      - 2.9      + 0.6      + 3.9      + 5.6      + 2.9 
Source:  EUROSTAT (CRONOS), new WIFO taxonomy, own calculations. 
The highest value of the indicator in 1998, i.e. the highest technological sophistication of 
domestic production, is recorded for the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The indicator for the 
Czech Republic and for Hungary is a bit lower, and Estonia and Poland, again, rank at the 
bottom of the list. The extents of change between 1995 and 1998 are generally much lower in 
domestic production, the only significant changes can be observed for Hungary and the Slovak 
Republic. Again, the indicator allows us to assess future productivity growth potentials in 
manufacturing industries of our selection of EU accession states: from the viewpoint of 
specialisation in domestic production, the Slovak Republic and (this time) Slovenia are best 
suited to experience productivity growth in manufacturing industry, whereas Poland and 
Estonia (again) exhibit the lowest potentials.  
We can hence observe some parallel characteristics in the ranking of the countries between 
foreign trade and domestic production specialisation. We, however, also recorded some 
differences in specialisation, in particular in trends and the absolute values of our indicator. 
How do differences in specialisation between foreign trade and domestic production affect 
productivity growth in manufacturing? 
4  Specialisation differences in foreign trade of CEECs with the EU 
and in CEEC’s domestic production 
From trade theory and in the relevant literature, it is typically expected that in mature and open 
market economies, the pattern of specialisation in foreign trade will mirror comparative 
advantages in the domestic economy and technology differences with the integration area. 
Furthermore, foreign trade structures will mirror specialisation patterns in domestic production. 
                                                 
9  Not surprisingly, the resulting grades for specialisation patterns in domestic production compare well 
with the results of the prior analysis; after all, the elasticities and shares of respective classes in total 
manufacturing were the same as used in this analysis. IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
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In our post-socialist economies, however, dissimilarity between foreign trade specialisation 
and domestic production specialisation is significant and even increased between 1995 and 
1998 in all countries except Slovenia.10  Table 4 reports the values of our dissimilarity 
indicator which is calculated as EUCLID-index of our four classes of manufacturing industries. 
Table 4  Difference-indicators of specialisation patterns between foreign trade of 
CEECs with the EU and in CEEC’s domestic production  
  Estonia    Poland    Czech Republic    Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
1995    8.2      14.8      12.0      19.5      19.5      24.0 
1998    9.2      20.7      21.7      32.7      27.1      23.0 
1998-1995    + 0.9      + 5.9      + 9.7      + 13.1      + 7.6      - 1.0 
Source:  EUROSTAT (CRONOS), new WIFO taxonomy, own calculations. 
Apparently, the largest divergences between the two specialisation patterns in the structures of 
CEEC’s exports to the EU and in structures of domestic production exist in the Slovak 
Republic and Hungary. These, however, only emerged recently: back in 1995, the structural 
patterns in both countries were much closer than in 1998. Their dissimilarity indices in 1995 
were closer also in comparison to Slovenia, albeit here, the patterns of specialisation have 
converged slightly between 1995 and 1998. Only in Estonia a re structural patterns 
comparable between foreign trade and domestic production, in line with our theoretical 
expectations. 
If, in the ‘export-led’ concept, technology transfer (from spread effects) is typically most 
pronounced between comparable (industrial) branches, then one could hypothesise that 
productivity growth should be fastest, where the pattern of foreign trade specialisation closely 
mirrors the specialisation displayed by domestic production. This hypothesis was tested 
empirically. 
A correlation analysis was conducted between the EUCLID specialisation indices and 
manufacturing productivity growth with the aim to determine the sign and strength of the 
correlation.11 In fact, our analysis established that there is a statistically significant negative and 
linear relationship between the EUCLID-indices and productivity growth with a coefficient of  
 
                                                 
10 The challenging question for future research is therefore concerned with which of the two distinct 
patterns of specialisation will prevail: the more labour-intensive and traditionally-oriented pattern of 
today’s domestic production, or the more technology-oriented pattern to be observed in today’s 
foreign trade with the EU. Following our assumption of ‘export-led development’, we would expect the 
latter to be dominant. 
11 For the correlations analysis, we chose the non-parametric Spearman-Rho specification: our data cannot 
be assumed to be normally distributed. However, we wanted to test for significance of our results to 
make sure that the correlation was not statistically coincidental. ___________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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-0.46 (with an error probability of slightly more than 2 per cent). The chart below (scatter 
diagramme) provides a graphical account of this correlation. 
Specialisation differences (EUCLID)



















































Chart  Correlation of specialisation differences and industrial productivity 
growth, 1995-1998 
Source:  EUROSTAT (CRONOS), new WIFO taxonomy, own calculations. 
The above hypothesis was therefore tested positively for our selection of EU accession states 
for the years of 1995 and 1998: if manufacturing productivity growth in CEECs is in fact 
driven by exporting, then productivity growth is fastest, where the pattern of foreign trade 
specialisation closely mirrors the specialisation displayed by domestic production. From this 
follows that the higher the proximity between the structure of domestic production and of 
exports, and the faster the convergence of those two structures, the better the prospects for 
future industrial productivity growth. 
If we use the results of this analysis for our attempt to determine the prospects of EU 
accession states to catch up in terms of manufacturing productivity growth, then we can 
conclude that productivity growth is likely to be accelerated by proximity and convergence of 
specialisation patterns in trade and production in the case of Estonia, and decelerated by 
dissimilarity and divergence of structural patterns in the case of the Slovak Republic, and to a 
minor extent in Hungary and the Czech Republic. 
5  Qualitative assessment of CEEC’s potentials for future 
manufacturing productivity growth 
We were able to present some stylised facts of specialisation patterns and attached 
expectations of their influence on productivity growth potentials to arrive at a variety of three 
different indicators for productivity growth potentials (tables 2, 3 and 4). Lacking a consistent 
Slope: 
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theory using the information of all three indicators simultaneously, we apply the simple 
statistical method of rescaling our results to a scale between 0 per cent for the lowest values 
of each indicator and 100 per cent for the highest value to make them directly comparable 
and interpret them as ‘grades’. Those three sets of rescaled percentage grades are then 
amalgamated by use of plausible weights12: the grades for domestic production structures are 
weighted with the factor 1, those for foreign trade are weighted by the share of exports in total 
trade of each country assessed13, and finally the grades for the structural dissimilarity with the 
absolute value of the slope of our correlation analysis, i.e. 0.46. 
Table 5  Ordinal grades for potentials of manufacturing productivity growth 
transmitted by structural specialisation patterns 
    Grades for specialisation ...   
    in domestic production    in foreign trade    dissimilarity   
Final 
grades 
EE   1995      0      0      100      15 
1998      7      0      100      16 
PO   1995      25      49      58      26 
1998      0      42      51      22 
CR   1995      87      72      76      41 
1998      72      80      47      38 
SR   1995      100      75      29      35 
1998      100      100      0      39 
HU   1995      42      80      29      33 
1998      59      92      24      37 
SI   1995      88      100      0      40 
1998      85      82      41      40 
Note:  The grades are rescaled to a scale between 0 per cent for the lowest values of indicators and 
100 per cent for the highest values. The higher the grades the higher also the indicated 
manufacturing productivity growth potentials. 
Source:  EUROSTAT (CRONOS), new WIFO taxonomy, WIIW database, own calculations. 
The individual grades and the resulting average grades over all three determinants for each 
country assessed and in 1995 and 1998 are reported in table 5. Those final results are then 
compared to the results generated in our prior analysis (Stephan, 2003). The objective of this 
                                                 
12 Of course, it would have been desirable to use weights endogenously generated from analysis of past 
experience with EU integration. However, this would necessitate a comprehensive model of the role of 
sectoral patterns in domestic production, foreign trade and the degree of correspondence between the 
two. This is however impossible to due to data-restrictions: longer time-series would be necessary to 
estimate sufficiently robust weights. 
13 The share of exports in total trade is approximated by the share of exports of goods (not services) in 
total aggregate production. The resulting weight for Estonia amounts to 0.21, that for Poland is much 
lower at 0.09, for the Czech Republic 0.17, for the Slovak Republic 0.18, for Hungary 0.15, and for 
Slovenia 0.23 (calculated from national accounts in respective national Statistical Yearbooks). ___________________________________________________________________ IWH 
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exercise is to refine the results generated by the analysis of specialisation patterns in domestic 
production alone to provide a more robust picture of productivity growth potentials 
determined by specialisation patterns. 
After correcting for the influence of foreign trade with the EU and for the influence of the 
extent of similarity of specialisation patterns between foreign trade and domestic production, 
the results broadly compare with the results of our prior analysis, indicating the robustness of 
our methods. However, the order of ranking of our selection of EU accession states turns out 
to be somewhat different to the results generated in the prior analysis: Estonia and Poland still 
rank lowest in terms of potentials for manufacturing productivity growth; their gaps to the 
values of the other countries are however significantly reduced. The highest grades are 
projected for Slovenia, replacing the Slovak Republic from the first rank in our prior analysis: 
here, the low rank for the dissimilarity index serves to downgrade the country to second place. 
Still slightly higher, though, than for the Czech Republic and Hungary. Those latter two 
countries also switched ranks: in the refined analysis, trends in emerging specialisation patterns 
play a lesser role than in the prior analysis; Hungary, however, displayed a trend to the 
advantage of the share of technology driven industries and to the detriment of the shares of 
mainly marketing intensive industrial branches, the class with the highest -negative- elasticity. 
With a view on the dynamics between 1995 and 1998, the probably most prominent result 
pertains to the drastic fall in the final grade for Poland, further reducing the low projected 
productivity growth potentials. A slightly less intense fall is recorded for the Czech Republic. In 
the Slovak Republic and Hungary, the final grade increases equally by 4 percentage points, 
improving our assessments of future prospects. 
Summary and policy-conclusions 
The objective of this analysis was to refine the results generated in a prior analysis pertaining to 
a projection of potentials for manufacturing productivity growth measured by specialisation 
patterns in domestic production only. The refinement of the analysis was attempted by taking 
into consideration the structural patterns in foreign trade and the similarity of patterns between 
foreign trade and domestic production. The results of this refined assessment is broadly in line 
with the results of our prior analysis, yet some slight differences emerged. 
In total, our analysis into the patterns of specialisation in domestic production and foreign trade 
suggests that Slovenia, the country with the highest level of economic development in general 
and the lowest productivity gap vis-à-vis the average EU-15 level amongst all EU accession 
states, contains the largest potentials for future manufacturing productivity growth. Second in 
the rank is the Slovak Republic, closely followed by the Czech Republic and Hungary. Poland  
 IWH ___________________________________________________________________ 
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and Estonia do not exhibit a just as bleak a prospect as was the case in our prior analysis, yet 
they still remain at the bottom of the league. What makes things even worse, the analysis also 
suggests that Poland’s prospects have significantly worsened between 1995 and 1998 due to 
adverse structural change within manufacturing. 
In terms of economic policy, it would be tempting to suggest the ‘picking of winners’ in 
interventions aimed at structural composition of domestic production and foreign trade. Of 
course, experience with efficiency and effectiveness of economic policy interventions teaches 
us that such direct tampering with market results is typically sub-optimal. Rather, economic 
policy can support and speed up structural adjustment directed by comparative advantages 
and intensifying integration by way of increasing flexibility. This, however, at the expense of 
risking that the pattern of specialisation might turn out to be quite disadvantaging for a 
particular EU accession state. Whilst this might be politically problematic due to the adjustment 
costs involved (unemployment), this path of development would resemble t he so-called 
‘turnpike-phenomenon’, in which the market shifts sectoral structures towards ‘less promising 
patterns’ yet fast growth before eventually ending up with ‘more promising’ structures. This 
might be particularly relevant in the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic. 
A safe policy in this respect could focus on the technological development by means of 
supporting R&D and the determinants of national innovation systems (see Radoševic 2003). 
Needless to say, foreign trade policy of the contemporary EU member states vis-à-vis the 
new members should aim at removing the remaining barriers to trade in particular in the 
‘sensitive’ areas. 
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